The Principles of LiquidFeedback

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Bibliographic references

  1. Alexander Hamilton: Speech at the New York convention for constitutional ratification, June 21, 1788. Michael P. Federici: The Political Philosophy of Alexander Hamilton, 2012, p. 76. ISBN 978-1-4214-0539-1 (9781421405391). Published by Johns Hopkins University Press.
  2. James Madison (as “Publius”): The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Federalist No. 10, November 22, 1787.  http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/poldocs/fed-papers.pdf  Published by Pennsylvania State University.
  3. Plato: The Republic, 360 BCE.  http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html  Published by Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
  4. Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell, February 2, 1816. The Founders' Constitution, Vol. 1, Chapter 4, Document 34.  http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch4s34.html  Published by The University of Chicago Press.
  5. David Bollier: LiquidFeedback—What A Genuine Democratic Process Looks Like.  http://bollier.org/blog/liquidfeedback-what-genuine-democratic-process-looks  Published May 7, 2012 by David Bollier, Amherst, Massachusetts, USA.
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  8. Decision of German Federal Constitutional Court: BVerfG, 2 BvC 3/07, March 3, 2009, Absatz Nr. 1–163.  http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/cs20090303_2bvc000307.html  Published by Bundesverfassungsgericht, Schlossbezirk 3, 76131 Karlsruhe, Germany.
  9. Constanze Kurz, Frank Rieger, Rop Gonggrijp: Beschreibung und Auswertung der Untersuchungen an NEDAP-Wahlcomputern.  http://wahlcomputer.ccc.de/doku/nedapReport54.pdf  Published by Chaos Computer Club e. V., Humboldtstraße 53, 22083 Hamburg, Germany.
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  11. Jan Behrens: Proportional Runoff Algorithm, March 14, 2013.  http://www.magnetkern.de/prop-runoff/prop-runoff.html  Published by Jan Behrens, Berlin, Germany.
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  13. Nicolaus Tideman: Collective Decisions and Voting – The Potential for Public Choice, 2006. ISBN 978-0-7546-4717-1 (9780754647171). Published by Ashgate.
  14. Markus Schulze: A New Monotonic and Clone-Independent Single-Winner Election Method. Voting Matters 17 (2003), pp. 9–19.  http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE17/I17P3.PDF  Published by the McDougall Trust (reg. charity no. 212151), 6 Chancel Street, London, SE1 0UX, United Kingdom.
  15. Markus Schulze: A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method. Social Choice and Welfare Vol. 36, Issue 2 (2011), pp. 267–303. Published by Springer.
  16. Markus Schulze: A New Monotonic, Clone-Independent, Reversal Symmetric, and Condorcet-Consistent Single-Winner Election Method, draft, July 2, 2012.  http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze1.pdf
  17. Thomas Schwartz: On the Possibility of Rational Policy Evaluation. Theory and Decision, Vol. 1, Issue 1 (1970), pp. 89–106. Published by Springer.
  18. Douglas R. Woodall: Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules. Discrete Applied Mathematics, Vol. 77, Issue 1 (1997). Published by Elsevier.
  19. Joseph Greenberg: Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives. Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 3 (May 1979), pp. 627–636. Published by the Econometric Society (Wiley-Blackwell).
  20. Norman Schofield, Bernard Grofman, Scott L. Feld: The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 1 (March 1988), pp. 195–211. Published by Americian Political Science Association (Cambridge University Press).
  21. Anthony J. McGann: The Tyranny of the Super-Majority: How Majority Rule Protects Minorities, 2002.  http://escholarship.org/uc/item/18b448r6  Published by University of California, Irvine, USA.
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  23. Website http://opensource.org/docs/osd  Published by Open Source Initiative, 855 El Camino Real, Ste 13A, #270, Palo Alto, California 94301, USA.
  24. Website http://www.public-software-group.org/licenses  Published by Public Software Group e. V., Johannisstraße 12, 10117 Berlin, Germany.
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  26. Joachim Behnke, Carolin Stange, Reinhard Zintl: Condorcet: Ausgewählte Schriften zu Wahlen und Abstimmungen, 2011. ISBN 978-3-16-148688-3 (9783161486883). Published by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Germany.
  27. Condorcet: Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. Imprimerie Royale, Paris, 1785.
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  29. Condorcet: Plan de constitution, présenté a la convention nationale les 15 et 16 février 1793. Published by Arthur O'Connor & F. Arago, Paris, 1847–1849, Vol. 12.
  30. Kenneth J. Arrow: A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 58, No. 4 (August 1950), pp. 328–346. Published by the University of Chicago Press.
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  32. Hervé Moulin: Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 45, Issue 1 (June 1988), pp. 53–64. Cornell University, Department of Economics. Published by Elsevier.
  33. Donald G. Saari: Geometry of Voting, 1994. ISBN 978-3-642-48646-3 (9783642486463) (Print), ISBN 978-3-642-48644-9 (9783642486449) (Online) Published by Springer.
  34. John H. Smith: Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate. Econometrica, Vol. 41, No. 6 (November 1973), pp. 1027–1041. Published by the Econometric Society (Wiley-Blackwell).